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Introduction 
 
 Debates continue to rage about the causes of recent currency and financial crises around 
the globe and their implications for the desirability of domestic and international financial 
liberalization. Beneath the heated exchanges of the most vocal disputants, a quiet consensus is 
beginning to emerge among serious scholars and policy officials. The big lesson from these 
crises is that while financial liberalization is still a desirable goal, it must be approached very 
carefully. It’s not just that without the proper pre-conditions liberalization will not provide full 
benefits. The results can sometimes be disastrous. What was once considered to be an arcane 
topic of interest only to a few economic and financial experts – the optimal sequencing of 
reforms – has forced itself front and center.  
 One of the reasons why this optimal sequencing literature has had relatively limited 
impact on actual reforms is that economists often disagree about what is optimal. Such disputes 
about the ideal helped obscure the wide range of agreement among experts about the ways in 
which financial liberalization should not take place.  There is not a high degree of correlation, 
however, between these areas of agreement among financial experts and the ways that actual 
reforms have been carried out. We suggest that this is an important reason why so many financial 
liberalizations have been followed by crises. 
Inadequate legal and social infrastructure and public and private risk management 
strategies can result in the less that ideal allocation of financial resources. More importantly, 
however, liberalizations in the presence of perverse incentive structures resulting from 
subsidized inputs and formal or informal government guarantees against losses leads to lending 
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that is both excessive and misallocated. Likewise, borrowers will not take adequate measures to 
guard against risk. The result is a recipe for financial crisis.  
This process is referred to as perverse liberalization. Despite its enormous importance it 
has received relatively little explicit attention. This paper is intended as a start toward filling this 
gap.  
 There are rich literatures on which we can draw in order to develop a better 
understanding of why financial liberalizations so often contain perverse elements. We can draw 
on the economic and financial literature to offer us numerous examples of the types of 
liberalizations that should be avoided. To explain why such perversities occur, however, 
economics alone cannot take us very far. Undoubtedly the lack of knowledge of the best 
economic and financial theory sometimes played a role in botched reform efforts but other 
elements were also at work, and these require a political economy perspective. 
 There is a rich literature on the political economy of financial liberalization on which we 
can draw. In the process, however, we need to un-bundle the dependent variable. The 
constituencies of perverse liberalizations may be quite different from those favoring 
liberalization in general. For example, sometimes one of the objectives of liberalization is to 
reduce the special benefits of crony firms.3 Liberalization of entry by new firms would be 
consistent with this objective. However, granting greater freedom to borrow abroad for already 
privileged firms and financial institutions could have just the opposite effect, as appears to have 
occurred in Korea.4 
 Of course, many of the more astute writers on the political economy of liberalization 
                                                 
3 See ….. 
4 See ……… 
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have been well aware of these distinctions.5 Still we believe that they have received far too little 
systematic attention. In this paper, we lay out some of the basic elements of perverse 
liberalization and discuss their role in contributing to the Asian crisis. We then turn to a 
preliminary exploration of the political economy causes of these perversities.  
The last two decades have seen notable developments in the financial sectors of many, if 
not most, developing and formerly communist countries.  The good news is that the costs of 
financial repression have become much more widely recognized and (at least partially) as a 
result financial sector liberalization, both domestic and international, became the dominant 
mantra of governments across the globe.  Thus, the apt relabeling of such countries as a 
emerging markets.  While the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank and the neo-liberal finance ministries in countries like the 
United States played a strong role in spreading the gospel of financial liberalization, the case for 
liberalization became accepted by many governments in the developing and transition countries, 
i.e., there has been a good deal of host government ownership of liberalization programs. 
Increasing financial globalization also played an important role, as this made the costs of 
financial restrictions more apparent.  Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviet Union some opined 
that the philosophical debate over economic systems had reached an end. 
By the late 1990s however, things looked rather less rosy than in those heady days in the 
early 1990s when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down.  Although there were prior warnings 
that heaven had not yet come to earth such as the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the real sea change 
came with the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998.  Suddenly financial 
liberalization did not look like such an obviously wise policy.  Had the world been sold a bill of 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Haggard (  ). 
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goods by neo-liberal ideologies?   Many on the left argued yes B that these crises showed the 
inherent instability of capitalism.  Several prominent economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati 
[1998], Dani Rodrik [1998], and Joseph Stiglitz [1998] joined this chorus- although generally 
with more nuanced arguments that other economists had oversold the benefits of the free 
movement of financial flows internationally.  It is not hard to agree with these critics that the 
benefits of liberalization were sometimes oversold and that the qualifications to the arguments 
for liberalization were not always stressed sufficiently, but this need not imply a wholesale 
rejection of the case for financial liberalization.  
So far, despite the sharp rhetoric of critics, the policy reactions against domestic and 
financial liberalization have been surprisingly mild.  The sharp reversal of liberalization called 
for by many in the late 1990s has so far failed to materialize on a broad scale. Some observers 
have noted the imposition of capital controls in Malaysia as an important exception to this 
liberalization trend. However, a closer look suggests that even Malaysia has become more liberal 
over time.6  Although Malaysian authorities imposed temporary exchange and capital controls, 
these controls exempted foreign direct investment. The Malaysian government has been slow to 
allow foreign competition in the banking industry in Malaysia, as has been the case in most of 
the emerging markets in Asia7 but since the beginning of the crisis, authorities have liberalized 
equity rules, permitting 100 percent foreign equity for new investments in the manufacturing 
sector. Also, foreign equity limits have been relaxed in telecommunications, energy, and 
insurance.  
                                                 
 
6 Ariff and Abubakar (1999), 432. 
7 ibid. 
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How one interprets the apparent link between financial liberalization and financial crises 
is crucial to the evolution of much of the global economy.  This paper starts with an acceptance 
that there has been a strong empirical link between financial liberalization and crises that goes 
far beyond the examples of the late 1990s.8  It argues, however, that this need not imply that 
liberalized financial markets are inherently highly unstable.  There may be some degree of causal 
connection between liberalized financial markets and excessive (i.e., unjustified) volatility.  
Economists are divided on this issue.  Efficient market types tend to make fun of those who 
argue that financial markets are susceptible to major swings of excessive optimism and 
pessimism while many market observers (including George Soros and Susan Strange) take such 
swings as axiomatic.9  The emerging sub-field of behavioral finance is attempting to bridge a gap 
between the extreme versions of these opposing views.10   
While declining to take a stand on this important debate, we do feel brave enough to 
assert that while imperfections in private capital markets may explain some of the incidence (and 
more likely the depth) of recent crises, a much more important factor has been at work. As will 
be discussed below, in the crises that we have analyzed carefully, i.e. the Asian and Russian 
cases, a major cause can be traced to the rational behavior of private market actors responding to 
perverse incentive structures generated by government policies and/or market failures. 
In many cases, problems were exacerbated by poor management practices in the private 
sector.  As we will argue in the following section, these resulted in the absence of sufficient early 
warning signals in the financial markets, lack of sufficient protection against the risk of crises, 
                                                 
 
8 See, for example, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), and Montes-
Negret and Landa  (2001). Include Caprio et al and Kaminsky & Reinhart. 
9  Soros (1998) and Strange (1988) 
10  For a discussion of efficient markets versus overshooting see Dean (2000) and (2001), Shefrin (2000) and Shleifer 
(2000). For an application of aspects of this view to the behavior of international financial markets see Willett 
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and possibly overreactions to the early stages of crises, but they were not the major reasons for 
the crises.  If our argument is accepted, even in part, then this focuses key attention on why 
financial liberalization so often takes place in ways that generate perverse incentives for private 
sector behavior.   
One obvious answer is the rent-seeking behavior of the private sector actors themselves.  
Who does not want access to subsidized credit and government guarantees to cover their losses? 
 What rational rent seeking financial sector actors would like is partial liberalization that gives 
them increased freedom of action to pursue profit opportunities while retaining barriers to 
competition from others, access to subsidized inputs, and protection against losses.  The resulting 
increase in rents can be used to reward the consenting bureaucratic and politicians with plenty 
left over for the financial sector actors themselves.  Thus we would expect that much, if not 
most, of the support for liberalization coming from the financial sector is for partial, not full, 
liberalization.   
We know from the economic theory of the second best that where there are a number of 
sources of inefficiency, improving efficiency on one margin can sometimes reduce rather than 
increase overall efficiency.  The experience with financial sector liberalization demonstrates that 
this is not just a theoretical curiosity.  For example, take Charles Calomiris’ description of a not 
atypical process of banking sector privatization in an emerging market country.11  Because of 
some combination of political connectedness and the too big to fail@ doctrine, what one often 
gets is only privatization of profits combined with the continued socialization of losses.  As the  
theory of moral hazard demonstrates, such a regime creates incentives for insufficient evaluation 
of loans and excessive risk taking.  Combined with an absence of effective prudential regulation 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2001). 
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and oversight, such a regime is a prescription for high levels of non-performing loans (NPL’s) 
and eventual bank insolvency.  This problem is especially severe in emerging markets, where 
well-trained regulatory personnel are often scarce.  However, the savings and loan crisis in the 
United States, the Swedish banking crisis of the 1990s and the ongoing difficulties of the 
Japanese financial system show that this is not just a problem of underdevelopment.  Perverse 
incentives can strike anywhere. 
Nor do we think that their prevalence is due entirely to rent seeking behavior.  Also 
important we suspect is the use of incorrect theories or wrong mental models by government 
officials who are attempting to do a good job.  We use theories and mental models in a broad 
sense to include not only formal economic models but also how issues are framed and what 
important assumptions are overlooked.  Thus we will argue that one of the problems with the 
process of international financial liberalization in Korea was that influential actors viewed this 
primarily as a balance of payments issue rather than one of financial stability.  Likewise, 
especially in the transition economies, many economists advocated liberalization without a good 
understanding of the legal and other types of infrastructure necessary for financial markets to 
work well. (This occurred in large part because many Western economists took the infrastructure 
which exists in their countries as a given and hence did not focus on the implications of its 
absence in countries they were advising).12   
Of course, one might question who are we to decide what is correct and what is incorrect 
in theory.  We think we have a reasonable answer.  We do not take sides on specific disputes 
about what is correct.  And there are many of these.  But even monetarists and Keynesians agree 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Calomoris (1998) 
 
12 After the recent Anderson and Enron scandals, economists are rethinking just how good is the financial 
infrastructure in industrialized countries. 
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about some things.  In a similar vein, there is a large literature on the optimal sequencing of 
financial liberalization, which is far from free of dispute.13  But while there is considerable 
disagreement among experts about the optimal sequence (and on what it depends), there is 
widespread agreement on some sequences that should be avoided.  Yet we see such bad 
sequencing behind many crises.  Thus while we will typically be agnostic about the correct 
model, we do feel justified in characterizing some models or views as wrong. 
Because perverse financial liberalization causes resource misallocation and financial 
crises, we argue that it is not safe to assume, as economists and officials often have, that 
imperfect liberalization is always better than no liberalization.  This is not to support continued 
financial repression, but to argue that liberalization must be carried out carefully and with full 
attention to the dangers of capture of the liberalization process by special interests.  Thus 
advocates of financial liberalization need to focus as much on political economy as on purely 
technical considerations.   
In order to aid this process, there is much we need to learn about the positive political 
economy of financial liberalization.  This has become a major topic of research in recent years.14 
 Most of this literature has focused on the causes of liberalization without differentiating between 
perverse and benign forms of liberalization.  Thus while there is much in this literature on which 
we can draw, this paper highlights the need to focus explicitly on the causes of perverse 
liberalization in hopes that this will give us clues about what to try to avoid and how to steer 
reform processes into safer and more productive channels.   
                                                 
13 See Wihlborg and Dezseri (1997), Edwards (1994), Harwood and Smith (1997), McKinnon (1991) 
14 See, for example, Haggard, Lee and Maxfield (1993), Haggard (2000), Keohane and Milner (1996), Horowitz and 
Heo (2001). 
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As an initial step, we discuss several major categories of perverse liberalization and give 
examples from the Asian crisis.  We also offer initial conjectures about the political reasons why 
such perverse liberalizations were adopted.  This is obviously only a preliminary step, but we 
hope that it will help stimulate interest in developing a more complete typology of perversities to 
be avoided and in undertaking careful case studies of the political economy of the liberalization 
process across different countries and episodes in order to give us insight into how to do it right, 
at least in the sense of knowing what to avoid. 
It will also be important to focus on the costs of different types of crises.  Crises are not 
something that should always be avoided at all costs.  Indeed, it has been argued that crises may 
often be a necessary and desirable way of attracting the high level political attention necessary to 
undertake fundamental reforms.  As R. Barry Johnston [1997] points out, in some countries, 
financial crises may have been necessary to promote a consensus on the need for action on 
restructuring the banking system and to overturn entrenched vested interests.15  He also notes the 
danger that crises can likewise result in the reversal of reforms.  Furthermore, even if we were 
sure that the net effect on the reform process would be positive, one must balance this against the 
costs of the crises.  In the case of currency crises in the European Monetary System in the early 
1990s, these costs were low and may even have been negative in the relatively short term as 
depreciation freed national governments to follow more expansionary economic policies.  In 
Asia the situation was quite different, however.  Thus while some crisis may be optimal from the 
stand point of the political economy of the reform process, not all will be. 
                                                 
15 See also the discussion in Wihlborg and Willett (1997), 41. 
  
   11 
The Asian Currency and Financial Crisis16 
It is not difficult to understand why so many commentators have blamed the Asian crisis 
on financial panic and the poor workings of liberalized international financial markets.  There 
was a substantial international dimension to the crisis, and there had been a great deal of 
financial liberalization.  Huge capital inflows in the early and mid-1990s came to an abrupt halt, 
followed by massive outflows.  Furthermore, one could not find a justification for this sharp 
reversal of flows in the behavior of the countries traditional macroeconomic variables.  In all of 
the crisis countries, inflation was low, investment was high, and budget deficits were small or 
non-existent.  Thus it is easy to see the attraction of explanations based on destabilizing 
speculation, financial panic, and self-fulfilling speculative expectations.   
The problem with this story is that it does not look at a broad enough set of fundamentals. 
 The primary causes of the Asian crisis were the interactions of exchange rate and financial 
sector problems.  The crisis started in Thailand and was due to a combination of a good old-
fashioned overvalued exchange rate and severe weaknesses in the domestic financial sector.  In 
fact, several Asian countries were experiencing real exchange rate appreciation by December of 
1996, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.17  The high level of aggregate 
investment in Thailand tended to obscure the fact that many of these investments had not been 
wisely chosen.  While the domestic macroeconomic indicators remained strong, at the micro 
level the loan and investment portfolios of many of the Thai banks and finance companies were 
                                                 
16 This section draws heavily on the analysis in Willett (2000) and Willett et al (2001).  For a representation 
sampling of other views on the Asian crisis see Agenor et al (2001), Classen and Frobes (2001), Dean (2001), Glick 
et al (2001), Horowitz and Heo (2001), Haggard (2000), Noble and Revenhill (2000), Woo, Sachs and Schwab 
(2000), Pempel et. al. (1999), Goldstein (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Macleod and Garnaut (1998), Radalet 
and Sachs (1998).  
17 Furman and Stiglitz (1998), 17. 
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in bad shape.  But published statistics such as the level of non- performing loans failed to give an 
accurate picture of this worsening situation. 
As the problems in the financial sector began to become more apparent, this interacted 
with growing concerns over the extent of overvaluation of the Thai bath’s pegged exchange rate, 
generating a reversal of capital flows and mounting speculative pressure on the baht.  The 
vulnerability of the Thai financial system to a currency crisis was exacerbated by the high levels 
of unhedged short term borrowing from abroad that had been stimulated at least in part by beliefs 
that the government would not allow major depreciations of the currencies, thus in effect 
eliminating exchange rate for foreign denominated loans at least in the minds of the borrowers 
and perhaps lenders as well. Excessive capital inflows may also have been generated by the 
expectation of IMF bailouts as many critics on the right have charged, but the composition of 
capital inflows shows that this cannot be the whole story.18  As depreciation of the baht became a 
plausible possibility, borrowers scrambled to cover their positions, leading to large capital 
outflows and in turn making depreciation more likely.  There were some outflows by outright 
speculators such as hedge funds, but they were small in comparison.19  The baht was in a sense 
brought down by self-fulfilling expectations, but these were based largely on sound, if belatedly 
recognized, analysis of the problems in the Thai financial sector and the overvaluation of the 
baht.  As will be discussed below, each of these salient features of the Thai crisis was due in 
substantial part to the operation of perverse incentives generated by government policies.  
Financial liberalization gave private sector actors more scope to operate on these incentives and 
                                                 
 
18 See Willett (1999); and Willett et. al. (2001) 
19 See Eichengreen and Mathieson (1998); and Willett et. al. (2001)  
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this magnified the size of the resulting problems, but it was the perverse incentives, not 
liberalization, that was the basic cause. 
Another reason why financial markets have been blamed so often as the cause rather than 
the messenger of the Asian crisis was the spread of the Thai crisis to a number of seemingly 
innocent victims.  While most analysts agree that the Thai baht was overvalued, this was not 
obviously the case for Indonesia, Korea, or Malaysia.  And their domestic macroeconomic 
indicators were good.  Thus the spread of the crisis could easily look like unjustified financial 
contagion resulting from panic. 
There is some truth to this argument, but it misses the main story.  There was some panic 
after the Thai devaluation and this was felt in a fairly undiscriminating way in currency and 
financial markets throughout Asia.20  These blanket repercussions were short-lived, however.  
The serious speculative attacks against Korea, for example, did not start until October, while 
Thailand abandoned its peg in early July.  It is hard to tell a story based on panic that is delayed 
by a number of months.  Rather, the causes of the crises in countries like Indonesia and Korea 
were the growing recognition that their financial sectors faced problems similar to those in 
Thailand that had not been clearly visible in the aggregate statistics available.21  As in Thailand, 
this was combined with large unhedged short-term debt.  Recognition of the seriousness of the 
situation rationally turned capital inflows into outflows and this caused the previously 
reasonably priced currencies to become seriously overvalued and hence generate rational 
speculative outflows. (Political instability was also an important factor in Indonesia).  This then 
set off an interrelation of currency and financial sector problems similar to what had occurred in 
                                                 
 
20 See, for example, Baig and Goldfajn (1998). 
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Thailand.  Thus in our judgment, the Asian crisis was due primarily (although not necessarily 
exclusively) to fundamentals- but these were financial, not macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Even if one takes a less favorable view of the rationality of market behavior than we do, 
there can be little question that perverse incentives generated by national governments played a 
major part in the Asian tragedy.  Thus it is clearly important to try to gain a better understanding 
of why these perverse incentives were put in place.  We will also see, however, that the 
international official community was not entirely blameless in this process.  Pressure from the 
IMF and national governments in the industrial countries for the Asian countries to open to their 
financial markets often gave insufficient attention to issues of sequencing and the existence of 
perverse incentives.  And the Basle Accord designed to strengthen financial standards had the 
unanticipated consequence of contributing to excessive capital inflows into several emerging 
market countries including Korea. 
 
Section I: Perverse Financial Liberalization 
The basic link between financial liberalization and crisis in Asia centers around two 
undesired outcomes: a weakening banking sector crippled by a high percentage of non-
performing loans; and the rapid increase in short-term foreign debt.  This section focuses on 
explaining the mechanisms by which liberalization resulted in such perverse outcomes.  For a 
variety of reasons, liberalization seems to have generated perverse incentives both for excessive 
risk-taking and over-borrowing. 
Explaining bad loans:  
                                                                                                                                                             
21 The extent of direct financial contagion to Indonesia remains in more dispute than for Korea.  It is often 
overlooked that while there were some immediate effects, heavy pressure on the                  did not begin until 
roughly a month after the baht’s depreciation. 
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One way to explain the high percentage of non-performing loans among banks in crisis 
countries is to focus on market failure in the form of moral hazard.  Moral hazard affects every 
domestic banking system to some extent even in the most open financial markets because even 
without capture by special interests, the crucial role played by the banking sector would lead 
almost any government to take steps to avoid the failure of large banks. This is the too big to fail 
form of moral hazard. Because this is the case, free market reforms in the banking sector will 
lead to perversities like excessive risk-taking due to moral hazard unless offset by government 
regulation.  However, the weakening of the banking sector is not inevitable and can be mitigated 
or exacerbated through public policy. Note that the nature of banking systems is such that 
complete laissez faire is unlikely to be optimal. Because of maturity transformation, i.e. banks 
borrow short term and lend long term, there is a need for lender of last resort type provisions that 
will inevitably create moral hazard problems, and hence will require some prudential regulations. 
But while some moral hazard in the banking sector is inevitable, in the Asian crisis countries, 
there was much more than necessary. In fact, there does seem to be some strong empirical 
evidence that moral hazard played a significant role in the Asian currency and financial crises.22 
In several of the crisis countries, explicit government guarantees served to exacerbate excessive 
risk-taking on the part of domestic banks and foreign investors.  In Malaysia, as of 1999 public 
funds such as the Employees Provident Fund were still being used to prop up the stock market 
and rescue privatized public enterprises, creating a situation whereby profits are privatized, but 
losses are virtually socialized.23 As late as August 1997, the Korean Ministry of Finance 
announced that it would guarantee all foreign debt, not only creating a huge moral hazard 
                                                 
 
22 Sarno and Taylor (1999), 655. 
23 Ariff and Abubakar (1999), 435. 
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problem, but also sending a signal that the corporate and banking sectors were facing serious 
difficulties.24 Moreover, not one chaebol had been allowed to fail for the entire decade before 
Hanbo Steel collapsed in 1997.25 
Yet another problem is that sound private management of banks cannot be relied upon 
during financial reform to mitigate some of the other problems associated with excessive risk-
taking. According to one observer, the combination of speculative domestic borrowers and 
abundant, but mostly short-term capital overwhelmed these Asian countries understaffed, 
inexperienced and immature financial institutions.26  Sound management is, in fact, unlikely at 
least immediately following a period of state interventionist financial policy.  State-led finance 
and finance allocation can leave a deficit of risk-management knowledge and experience within 
the private sector. Under these conditions, market reform can lead to poor decisions and a heavy 
short-term debt burden. Insufficient evaluation of monetary investments may lead to a 
misallocation of finance and non-performing loans over and above those resulting just from 
excessive risk taking.  The lack of risk management skills in Korea is of course a by-product of 
the long-time state-bank-chaebol relationship where the banking system served as a conduit for 
policy loans.  By most accounts, that relationship has yet to be fully severed, and it should come 
as no surprise that the banking industry, throughout Asia, currently suffers from a paucity of 
risk-management skills.27 
Another contributor to the financial weakness of the private banking sector has to do with 
the incentives behind bank ownership.  Privatization of state-owned banks constitutes an 
important component of the financial reform process. Yet the privatization process itself can fall 
                                                 
 
24 Demetriades and Fattouh (1999), 790. 
25 Radelet and Sachs (1998), 14. 
26 Katz (1999), 428. 
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prey to perverse incentives. This can be viewed as an incompatibility between political 
motivations and economic incentives, or as political capture of the reform process.  For example, 
privatization in principle should lead to greater overall efficiency as the private sector possesses 
some comparative advantage over government in making profit-maximizing economic decisions. 
However, the privatization process is particularly susceptible to political capture/rent-seeking 
given the stakes involved, as with the charter of new merchant banks in Korea. The government 
converted twenty-four financially weak short-term financing companies into merchant banks in 
two separate rounds: nine in 1994 and fifteen in 1996. They proceeded to engage in risky foreign 
exchange transactions. Among the banks whose licenses were revoked in 1998, five were new 
entrants from 1994, and ten were from 1996.  Thus, government reforms encouraged greater debt 
exposure in an already overexposed financial system.28  Moreover, in Korea as part of financial 
reform banks were allowed to open and expand operations overseas. As a result, banks expanded 
their foreign currency denominated business as aggressively as they did their domestic loan 
portfolios.  The net result was an increase in foreign currency liabilities of overseas branches that 
was almost as large as the external debts of domestic branches.29 Nor did this happen only in 
Korea. The number of nonbank financial institutions expanded dramatically in Thailand as well 
prior to the crisis.30 In fact, throughout East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, there had been a 
proliferation of new banking and quasi-banking institutions with little equity capital and less 
experience, nearly all engaged directly or indirectly in intermediating foreign capital.31  
Build-up of short-term debt:  
                                                                                                                                                             
27 Ariff and Abubakar (1999), 434. 
 
28 Auerbach (2001), 208. 
29 Dooley and Shin (1998), 4. 
30 Furman and Stiglitz (1998), 7. 
31 Katz (1999), 428. 
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Obviously the build-up of short-term debt severely weakened the domestic banking 
sectors of crisis countries in Asia. And clearly the governments had a lot to do with encouraging 
short-term debt build-up.32  One way to understand why short-term debt skyrocketed with 
financial deregulation is to look at the incentive structures created by state regulation of the 
financial sector before liberalization and to understand that pre-liberalization those perverse 
incentives might have been held in check by government oversight. For example, continued 
government control over the long-term capital market, in the form of window guidance or direct 
controls over interest rates, created a shortage of long-term capital during the earlier rapid 
growth period in most Asian countries.  This shortage encouraged the use of short-term credit to 
finance long-term investments.  This perverse incentive ultimately led to a perverse outcome in 
the form of a mismatch of borrowing and lending terms which is widely acknowledged to be one 
of the main ingredients of the Asian financial crisis.33    Under these conditions, reform may 
encourage market actors to take advantage of pre-existing incentives because oversight has 
diminished.   
The starkest example of this kind of perverse incentive is the liberalization of the short-
term loan market in the context of an already weakened banking sector.34  When governments in 
East Asia liberalized their banking sectors and capital markets, they began by opening up only 
the short-term maturity end of these markets.  Unfortunately, this segment of the market tends to 
be characterized not only by short-term horizons on the part of investors, but also by short-term 
rent-seeking for quick profits by banks taking advantage of close ties with government.35  Some 
Korean banks actually had a negative net worth when the loan market was liberalized. The fact 
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that banks with negative net worth could continue to operate obviously is more a function of 
inadequate prudential regulation in the pre-liberalization period than of liberalization per se.  
However, in this context of insolvency, liberalization may have actually exacerbated the problem 
because banks with negative net worth do face strong (perverse) incentives to load up on short-
term debt as a means of gambling for redemption in a liberalized short-term loan market. That is, 
if the banking system is unsound due to a large debt overhang or a large percentage of non-
performing loans that have not yet been written off, these banks have very little to lose by 
loading up on more risky but potentially highly profitable new loans made accessible as a result 
of liberalization. This is especially true when viewed in conjunction with the too big to fail form 
of moral hazard.  In both cases, the down-side risks of taking on more short-term loan risk is 
considerably discounted in comparison with the upside of redeeming a failing business enterprise 
with the infusion of fresh capital. 
Governments further encouraged the build-up of short-term debt by liberalizing the loan 
market while implicitly lowering the perceived costs of foreign borrowing through the pegged 
exchange rate.36  Most of the crisis country governments sharply limited the size of exchange 
rate fluctuations and fostered the impression that the private sector need not worry about the 
possibility of large depreciation. Thus the substantial differential between high domestic interest 
rates in the crisis countries and low rates in Europe, Japan and the U.S was seen as a source of 
arbitrage profits or low borrowing costs rather than as an indicator of differentials in risk. As a 
consequence, much of the crisis country foreign borrowing went unhedged. Thus, financial 
sector liberalization and exchange rate policies interacted perversely. In many countries, often 
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with explicit government encouragement, the private sector came to believe that large exchange 
rate depreciations would not be allowed, or if such changes did occur nationals would be 
compensated by the government. This both encouraged foreign borrowing and discouraged the 
purchase of forward cover as an insurance against the risk of major exchange rate changes. 
Not only was short-term borrowing frequently given an indirect subsidy through 
exchange rate pegging, in some cases governments even gave tax incentives that encouraged 
short-term borrowing.  A prime example of the encouragement of such borrowing is given by 
Thailand’s creation of the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF). While originally 
designed only to give encouragement to the creation of Bangkok as an international financial 
center by giving a tax break to foreign borrowings which were then re-lent abroad.  By the time 
the BIBF had traveled from the Finance Ministry through the Thai political process, the 
requirement that the borrowed capital be re-exported had been effectively dropped, leaving a net 
subsidy to foreign borrowing. 
As all of these examples suggest, one of the most powerful variables in explaining the 
incidence of recent international currency crisis is a high ratio of short-term foreign debt to a 
country’s international reserves.37.  Private actors of course have incentives to worry about their 
liquidity situation within the context of the normal operation of the economy. They typically do 
not have incentives, however, to worry sufficiently about so-called systemic risk because of the 
externalities generated by financial interdependence during crisis. Many economists, such as 
Eichengreen and Stiglitz, argue that because unhedged short term foreign borrowing in emerging 
markets carries these negative risk externalities, they should be subject to a corrective tax, or 
regulation. The so-called Chile tax is an example of this approach.  Additional foreign currency 
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borrowing by one firm or bank increases not only its own risk but also the risk of other 
borrowers who would also be hurt if a crisis occurred. This externality presents a case for 
government oversight or regulation of some types of banking and financial market activities to 
avoid excessively risky positions. Such interdependence externalities also provide a powerful 
argument for the government to play the role of a lender of last resort. The classic example is the 
bank, which has made sound long-term loans but could be forced into bankruptcy by a run on its 
deposits. This provides a widely accepted rationale for government policies to deal with such 
panic or crisis. The problem is that by doing so, the government lessens the incentives for the 
bank to worry sufficiently about the quality of the loans and investments it makes. In other 
words, the prospect of bailouts creates moral hazard. This in turn provides a need for some form 
of government oversight to help reduce the likelihood of bad loans. That’s supposed to be how it 
works. And like the industrial countries, all of the major emerging markets had systems of 
oversight in place. The problem was that they were not very effective. 
But excessive risk and short-term borrowing is not just an oversight issue. The 
sequencing of reform itself can also create perverse incentives. For example, the Koreans 
liberalized short-term bank lending while maintaining restrictions on the long-term loan market. 
This is just the reverse of the normally recommended sequence of liberalization. This partial 
nature of liberalization led to perverse incentives for short-term borrowing over and above 
international financial market trends.  Taken together with Korea’s status as a successful export-
led economy with a balance of payments surplus, the accelerating rate of liberalization attracted 
a substantial amount of short-term bank credit from abroad (supply-side).  The liberalization of 
short-term finance in contrast with the continued regulation of the long-term capital market and 
portfolio investment encouraged businesses to borrow short-term (demand- side). This 
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sequencing of short-term before long-term financial liberalization also encouraged vigorous 
competition in the short-term loan market by chartering new merchant banks that had an 
advantage in international borrowing before implementing a prudential regulation system with 
sufficient oversight capacity and without insuring that new banks (or any banks) possessed 
adequate risk management skills. 
III. The political economy of perverse liberalization 
If liberalization as implemented by Korea and many others led to so many perversities 
and ultimately economic hardship, why did they liberalize in the way that they did? There are 
two important reasons to take a political economy perspective here. The first is that if even some 
of the reform perversities were foreseeable, then the only way to explain these policies without 
assuming irrational policymakers is to look at political influences. The other reason is that 
sometimes what appears to be a bad economic decision may actually be a best alternative within 
a political economy context.  For example, it could make sense to implement reforms that make 
economic crisis more likely if one’s goal is to further the reform process.  As discussed earlier, 
crises are not always bad. Sometimes the costs may be fairly low and they generate further 
reforms so that the net effects can be positive in a dynamic sense. Thus, from a political 
economy perspective, one can argue for initial reforms that will create problems, which will 
stimulate further reforms. Deregulation of only some interest rates is an example.  This will 
distort financial flows and can create a support base for further reforms. Thus optimal 
sequencing from a political economy perspective can sometimes look quite different than it 
would from a purely economic or state efficiency perspective.38  If the crisis generated is too 
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costly, however, then the whole liberalization process can be set back.39 The recent crises in 
Mexico and Asia were ones where the costs were enormous.  Even if they have not set back the 
general process of liberalization, the costs have been so high that it would be extremely difficult 
to argue that these episodes reflected points on an efficient path towards liberalization.  
What follows is an attempt to explain various influences over the formation of reform 
policy. We argue that perverse liberalization results from a combination of political pressure 
from both domestic and international actors as well as the interplay between policymaking 
officials and domestic elites and the mental models which actors adopt. The relative strength of 
these variable influences is likely to vary from one case to another.   
a. Interest groups 
We start by looking at politically entrenched domestic interest groups and rent-seeking 
behavior. The most common way that Asian governments have benefited these groups is through 
restrictions on foreign competition in the banking sector.  For example, the Malaysian 
government throughout the 1990s restricted the amount of public-sector business that could go to 
foreign banks, froze new bank licenses just as foreign banks sought entry, and imposed strict 
limits on branch expansion for existing banks.40  But this form of financial sector protectionism 
prevailed in most Asian countries even while financial liberalization proceeded in other areas. 
Even in Hong Kong, arguably the most laissez-faire of the Asian emerging markets, the domestic 
banking sector enjoyed protection from foreign competition.41   
Big business and banks in Asia also influenced the sequencing of reform in the loan 
market. A detailed look at the reform process in Korea will help to illustrate how financial-
                                                 
39 Haggard and Maxfield, (1996) 
40 The Economist (1997), 26. 
41 Auerbach (2001), 125-127. 
  
   24 
industrial conglomerates influenced the liberalization process despite the government’s apparent 
desire to avoid such outcomes.  Needless to say, in countries where crony capitalism was the 
norm, such influence could play out even more explicitly.42  Korean state managers came under 
significant pressure by 1993 from the chaebol to liberalize short-term finance.43  There is no 
question the move toward liberalized financial markets fit in with the Kim Young Sam 
governments Ase-gye-wha globalization priority, and therefore served a political function. But 
this does not explain why both short-term and long-term credit markets were not liberalized.  
Ironically, policymakers suggested that one of the strongest reasons for introducing competition 
in the market for bank loans was to mitigate the considerable economic power and influence of 
the chaebol. Indeed, controlling the excesses of big business throughout the liberalization 
process was an explicit goal for Korean policymakers.44  The state first embarked upon financial 
liberalization in 1980 not with the idea of letting market forces reign freely, but rather with the 
idea of building new institutions between the state and big business that would serve to ensure 
economic control over big business irregularities and to prevent its dominance in the market.  
Korean officials saw liberalization as redefining the rules in order to continue meeting prudential 
objectives and prevented the exercise of cartel-like private market power.45  Part of the long-term 
liberalization plan was to restrict big business privileged access to policy loans and their 
oligopolized production in the market.46  The reform-oriented officials firmly believed that 
economic liberalization would not be successful without preventing further business 
concentration.  State control over big business served not only the states economic goals but also 
its political goals.  The Chun regime (1981-88) put an emphasis on the political goal of the 
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welfare and justice society against the previous regimes collusive state-big business ruling 
coalition, thus pinning the new regimes legitimacy on its ability to control big business.47 
But despite rather explicit state goals to avoid such outcomes, there is considerable 
evidence that the content and sequence of Korean liberalization ultimately allowed the chaebol 
to take advantage of perverse incentives.  That is, the rather unbalanced form that financial 
opening took was partially a result of the unyielding pressure from the chaebol, who saw short-
term borrowing as a way to get around government restrictions on borrowing and investment 
decisions as well as the capitalization restrictions.  Some observers have described the 
government strategy of liberalizing short-term borrowing while leaving long-term borrowing 
regulated as government officials giving in where pressures were strong and holding back where 
it was not.48  Given the short-term nature of NBFI (non-bank financial institution) borrowing, the 
liberalization of the short-term market prior to the long-term market was an understandable 
outcome of interest politics. During the 1994-1996 investment boom, large enterprises accounted 
for 45.7% of debt, while small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for only 17.7%.49 The 
financial sector also showed signs of increasing concentration with the top eight nationwide 
banks together accounting for two-thirds of the entire commercial banking sector, and three-
quarters of total commercial bank assets.50  Between 1994 and 1996, foreign bank lending to 
Korea went from $52 to $108 billion.  About $60 billion of debt outstanding in 1997 was used by 
the chaebol to finance direct investments abroad.  Korean banks invested in foreign assets with 
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funds borrowed from foreign banks in the range of $23 billion.51  The reliance of the chaebol on 
bank borrowing--as opposed to equity or bond financing-- increased leverage ratios and made 
the chaebol highly susceptible to bankruptcies when hit with shocks.  In turn, the health of the 
banking sector became heavily dependent on the viability of the chaebol, since such a high 
fraction of bank assets are in the form of lending to these enterprises.52 Korean financial 
institutions were over-exposed to foreign-exchange risk and a high proportion of foreign 
liabilities had relatively short maturities.  So at the very least, deregulation of the financial sector 
in the early 1990s, together with ongoing features of the government-banking-chaebol 
relationship, increased Korea’s vulnerability to outside capital flows by creating the incentive for 
short-term indebtedness.53 
Finally, large business groups throughout Asia benefitted from the process of bank 
privatization. As many scholars have pointed out, privatization because of the large stakes 
involved is particularly prone to rent-seeking and capture. In countries like Korea, and even now 
Taiwan, government relaxation of controls over entry and ownership has led to the largest 
business groups dominating both the ownership of commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions.54  One result in Korea was that credit became concentrated with the largest thirty 
business groups receiving over 70% of total short-term credit.55  One potential sticking point for 
Korean officials was that in order to strengthen banks, it was necessary to end the ban on 
chaebol ownership of them. But bank privatization only strengthened the already powerful 
chaebol.56  
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b. Foreign pressure 
Foreign international pressures for financial liberalization can come through several 
channels. One is through impersonal market forces.  That is, the degree of international capital 
mobility can influence the costs and benefits of a wide array of financial strategies. Actions by 
other emerging market governments may also have important effects through this channel. 
Liberalization of competitors raises the costs of continued restrictions in the home country. 
A second is through influence on actors’ mental models. While the extent of influence is 
open to debate, there can be little question that attitudes toward financial liberalization had 
become much more favorable in the 1990s than in the 1970s, and that the international 
transmission of ideas has a good deal to do with these changed attitudes.  
A third channel is through direct pressure. This can come via direct lobbying on 
emerging market governments by international financial interests, but such pressures are perhaps 
more commonly intermediated by national governments in the industrialized countries 
(Bhagwati’s Wall Street-Treasury complex). Of course lobbying, persuasion, arm-twisting, etc 
from industrial country governments and the international financial institutions can come from 
sincere beliefs that liberalization is in the best interests of the emerging market countries. The 
relative influence of interests and ideas or ideology in this context will often be difficult if not 
impossible to tease out. Assuming that bureaucrats throughout Asia have been reluctant to cede 
discretionary power to the private sector, one could interpret the decision to liberalize short-term 
finance as the result of market pressure. That is, international finance brought the most market 
pressure to bear in the short-term credit market in part because the volume of short-term 
financial flows was so much greater.  In other words, bureaucrats failed to liberalize long-term 
finance because they possessed the capability to resist, whereas they could not resist the tide of 
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market forces in the short-term financial market. Also long-term lending by its very nature can 
tolerate deviations away from market prices because of non-monetary criteria such as recurrent 
contracting which may lower transactions costs. 57 
External pressure for financial markets opening can be extremely powerful. This is an 
area in which unintended consequences are of major importance. Sometimes the effects on 
emerging markets are the result of industrial country policies. Fluctuations in credit conditions in 
the rich countries have been shown to have strong effects on the size of international financial 
flows to emerging markets. Less inevitably, the efforts of the industrial countries to develop 
better standards for risk management by the major international banks resulted in incentives for 
the banks to shift from longer term to short term lending.58 The so called Basle Accord on capital 
adequacy standards for banks reflected a substantial achievement of international cooperation, 
but few noticed at the time that this was followed quickly by a dramatic increase in the ratio of 
short term to long term bank loans going to emerging markets. This was the result of the much 
higher ratios of capital required to back bank loans of over one year. 
The Czech Republic, Mexico, and Korea were hit by a double whammy. By achieving 
sufficient economic and political success to be allowed to join the industrial countries as 
members of the OECD they automatically qualified under the Basle rules for a lower risk 
category with lower capital requirements on loans. And sure enough, their admissions were 
followed by surges of capital inflows (concentrated of course on the short-term end). This 
problem has at last become well recognized. Indeed, it was rumored that at one point the U.S. 
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government argued against the admission of Slovakia to the OECD on the grounds that there was 
a danger this would lead to a financial crisis. 
These industrial country institutional innovations had little influence on the portfolio 
managers that are so often blamed for international financial crisis; but perceptions of their 
influence are often highly exaggerated. When one looks at the statistics on the composition of 
the capital outflows from Asia during the crisis, the effects of the actions of the staid old 
international bankers were far larger than those of the portfolio managers. Indeed, while it is 
hard to get data, many observers argue that so called capital flight by domestic nationals was 
much larger than for international portfolio investors. It is well documented that the run on the 
peso in 1994 was initiated by Mexican nationals, not international investors. 
 But we cannot totally discount the more formal external pressures to liberalize. In Korea, 
President Kim’s desire to join the OECD, combined with pressure from the IMF and the US 
government may have led to the liberalization of domestic financial markets before existing 
weaknesses in the banking system, including poor regulatory and supervisory framework, could 
be addressed.59  So while liberalization may have taken place in the absence of foreign pressure, 
the nature and timing of liberalization may have been acutely affected. 
c. Popularism 
In the case of Korea, as with economic policymaking in many countries, it is difficult to 
separate the concept of popularism from nationalism.  The long history of discouraging foreign  
direct investment in Korea underscores the effect of popularism on foreign economic policy.  
Because foreign direct investment happens to be one of the more stable forms of capital flow, 
especially when compared with portfolio capital, these restrictions take on added importance 
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given the role of excessive short-term capital flows in exacerbating if not causing crises.  Why 
was the Korean government so reluctant to allow foreign direct investment? It is difficult to 
explain this on the basis of nationalism alone if one considers that Mexico has historically been 
extremely nationalistic, but has now welcomed foreign direct investment.  Moreover, one might 
have expected a strong demonstration effect given the timing of Mexico’s success in allowing 
FDI, and the Korean financial crisis. Yet if we consider the economic and political costs and 
benefits, the Korean reluctance to allow FDI does make political sense.  The NAFTA package 
required Mexican officials to abandon or at least step back from the nationalistic banner, but it 
also offered something in return, access to the vast U.S. market. For Korea, the prospect of 
allowing FDI was more of a unilateral political cost up front for the promise of greater economic 
performance later. But even the long-term benefits of FDI were not uniformly accepted by 
Korean policymakers because Korea could point to a long record of economic growth and 
development in the absence of FDI. Popularism may also play a pervasive role in blocking the 
reform process in general, insofar as there are considerable short-term costs associated with 
financial liberalization.  Government officials may find it difficult to dismantle a system of 
policy loans if the recipients of those loans have played an important welfare function, as the 
chaebol did in Korea.60  In Mexico, financial-industrial conglomerates similarly served the 
function of dispersing government credit, especially to the rural sector, in the days of heavy 
government intervention in the financial sector.61   One clear indication that Korean officials 
have especially resisted reforms that were likely to be unpopular is that only with the IMF 
providing a shield for the regime post-crisis, has there been any attempt to implement unpopular 
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reforms like legalizing layoffs and allowing corporate bankruptcy. But it may not just be the IMF 
shield that has made structural reforms more palatable.62  It may also be the case that market 
reform is more likely to be taken up as a populist cause in a post-crisis environment. This has 
certainly been the case in Latin America as well as Eastern Europe.63 
d. Policymaking mistakes and bad mental models 
In addition to the political influences of outside forces on government policy, we must 
look at the interests and perspectives of state policymakers themselves, some of which has 
already been discussed in the form of incentives created by government policy. But in addition to 
creating unintended perverse incentives or falling prey to political influences (both domestic and 
international), there is considerable evidence that in countries like most of the countries in 
question, policymakers possessed some policymaking autonomy or insulation from constituent 
pressures.   
One particularly troubling aspect of perverse liberalization shared by most of the crisis 
countries is the lack of prudential regulation. The poor quality of bank supervision--lax 
prudential rules and financial oversight-- led to a sharp deterioration in the quality of banks' loan 
portfolios in countries like Korea and Mexico.64  While most economists agree on the need for 
capital-account liberalization, they have also come to believe that banks should first upgrade 
their risk-management practices and supervisors should strengthen oversight of financial 
institutions.65 There is quite a bit of consensus among experts that prudential regulation is a key 
ingredient in any successful liberalization effort. This makes the lack of such safeguards even 
more puzzling.  But this too can be explained as rational actors, in this case policymakers, facing 
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perverse incentives.  By definition, prudential regulation must be initialized and carried out by 
government officials. Yet, this process involves a high degree of incentive incompatibility 
because state bureaucrats are enmeshed in a patronage system that they themselves are supposed 
to be charged with cleaning up.  Even if that system is now proving to be increasingly 
inefficient, the direct participants in the system may still be benefiting in some way while the 
costs are dispersed among the broader population. 
In Korea for example, lax prudential regulation allowed heavy concentration of lending 
and the disproportionate growth between Korean banks and non-bank industries. In a three-year 
period alone leading up to the crisis, merchant banks acquired $20 Billion in foreign debt.66  
Regulation was especially lax for newly licensed merchant banks whose capital requirements in 
proportion to loans were woefully inadequate.  The same can be said for Thailand. This fact 
alone significantly further increased the vulnerability of the banks to business failure.  But the 
lack of prudential regulation, an act of omission, also interacted with the removal of various 
government restrictions on foreign borrowing, an act of commission, to exacerbate banking 
sector weaknesses.  Financial liberalization and tight money kept domestic interest rates above 
world rates, which encouraged domestic banks to rely on foreign credit. The pegged exchange 
rate also encouraged the perception that foreign capital was relatively cheap, contributing to the 
wave of excessive short-term foreign borrowing that was intensified by ineffective prudential 
supervision. And because private actors considered the pegged exchange rate system quite 
credible, they made borrowing decisions under a false sense of security.67   
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This paints a rather pessimistic picture of governments’ ability to improve prudential 
regulation because despite a growing consensus that strong oversight and the enforcement of 
sound banking practices are necessary, a lack of risk management skills and perverse incentives 
facing financial decision-makers in the liberalization process make it unlikely. Nevertheless, 
there are positive examples of how prudential regulation can be enforced by relying on sound 
incentives and avoiding perverse ones. In Malaysia, for example, officials have insisted on best 
banking practices as a condition for debt-restructuring and recapitalization. The Securities 
Commission has also attempted to encourage greater corporate disclosure, codes of conduct, and 
business ethics by making it compulsory for listed companies to release their financial results on 
a quarterly basis.68 It is interesting to note that Malaysia is considered by most observers to have 
been the least market friendly in its response to the crisis in Asia. It does, however, appear that 
public-sector macroeconomic governance has been comparatively good in Malaysia by regional 
and global standards.69 
Perverse liberalization may also result from policymakers with good intentions getting it 
wrong in one of two ways: either by focusing on the wrong issue or employing a flawed 
economic model.  An example of the former is that Korean policymakers were overly concerned 
with current account balance rather than debt structure. In practice, this meant that policymakers 
were unwilling to allow substantial exchange rate flexibility for fear of losing control over an 
important trade policy tool.  Political incentives to give too much weight to short-run exchange 
rate stability led these countries to practice insufficient flexibility. Why did the external balance 
loom so large as to overshadow concern with the rapidly growing short-term debt structure of 
many domestic enterprises in Asia?  One reason could be that exchange rate changes can affect 
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government finance itself aside from its effect on private markets. Devaluation would tend to 
contract imports which would in turn sharply reduce customs collections and overall government 
revenue.  This was in fact the case in the Philippines in the aftermath of the crisis.70  Another 
reason might have been that these countries, especially Korea, tended to attract foreign capital in 
part based on their reputation for export competitiveness. Losing control over trade policy meant 
not only losing control over the trade balance but financial flows as well. There is some evidence 
that the balance of payments turning to deficit prior to the crisis did in fact affect Korea’s credit 
worthiness, which suggests that the linking of trade with loan availability in the minds of 
policymakers was not completely unfounded. 
Also, from a domestic political perspective, the Kim Young Sam government’s mandate 
depended upon continued international competitiveness.  His administration had declared 
globalization as its top priority.71  In Mexico, on the other hand, where the norm was a balance 
of payments deficit prior to 1994, policymakers were not expected to deliver international 
competitiveness, but rather domestic stability. This explains in part the resistance to devaluation 
in Mexico. What policymakers did bank on was the idea of delivering NAFTA.  
With respect to economic theories, one could argue that policymakers in countries like 
Korea and especially Japan never really bought into the benefits of financial liberalization.  That 
is, no paradigm shift has taken place from an interventionist developmental state model to a free 
market liberalization model.  Here it is instructive to compare Korean with Mexican 
liberalization with respect to world-view and the belief in models alternative to the Western Free 
Market model among policymakers. Mexico had to abandon the state-led model in the early 
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1980s (debt crisis), but Korea hung on to it.  This even though both come under international 
pressure to liberalize from IMF/US.  Also, the economic success experienced by Korea in the 
1980s and early 1990s reinforced the interventionist model in the minds of policymakers while 
simultaneously encouraging excessive and speculative short-term capital flows that helped 
destabilize the Korean economy, especially in the context of perverse liberalization. In Mexico, 
success did the same thing in the early 1990s, which contributed to the 1994 crisis, but the 1980s 
had seen a more thorough dismantling of the state-led financial system than in Korea. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
We hope that the preceding has been sufficient to convince the reader that the causes of 
perverse financial liberalization, both domestic and international, should be an important topic 
for political economy research. A major part of this will involve continuing the recent research 
on the political economy causes of financial liberalization in general. Especially important here 
we believe are more detailed delineation and investigation of the various channels through which 
market pressures generate incentives for liberalization. Much of the recent literature takes it as 
axiomatic that increasing globalization generates strong pressures for liberalization. This is 
undoubtedly true, but just as with financial crisis, governments can respond to these pressures in 
many ways including imposing more barriers. We also know relatively little about the relative 
influence on liberalization of different types of capital flows and financial actors and about the 
relative importance of government perceptions of anticipated market reactions to policies and 
developments versus direct lobbying by market actors and indirect lobbying via institutions such 
as the IMF and US Treasury. 
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Turning to perverse liberalization, we need to develop a more comprehensive analytical 
taxonomy of the major types of perverse liberalization and begin to investigate more 
systematically their incidence under different types of circumstances. For example, are some 
types of political systems more subject to perverse liberalization than others? We would expect 
governments that are strongly beholden to concentrated financial interests to be more susceptible 
to perverse liberalization. The influence of populism seems less clear. One can easily conjecture 
scenarios where this could go in either direction. We would expect elite bureaucracies to reduce 
the incidence of perverse liberalization, but the case of Japan illustrates that an elite bureaucracy 
is not sufficient protection against severe bad loans problems. And both China and Japan 
illustrate that the maintenance of heavy government direction and regulations is also no 
guarantee against the development of major bad loan problems in the financial sector. 
Another important issue for investigation is whether patterns of perverse liberalization 
vary across countries with different economic ideologies and developmental strategies. Are there 
correlations between the incidence of perverse liberalization and countries levels of 
development, legal traditions, degree of political freedom, and numerous other factors being 
identified in the rapidly expanding literature on institutions and economic performance?  How 
has the degree of IMF and World Bank involvement influenced the success record of 
liberalization?  How the track record of crisis induced liberalizations compared with 
liberalizations emanating from other sources?   And what can we learn from the limited number 
of successful financial liberalizations that have taken place? 
A Concluding Comment 
We may hope that such positive political economy research will give us insights into 
normative policy issues and that by taking political economy considerations into account 
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countries will be able to find greater scope for liberalization that avoid the types of perversities 
highlighted in this paper. While there is much analysis and research to be done, one conclusion 
of which we are confident is that the development of good policy will not be aided by continued 
ideological debate at the level of states versus markets. The theory of second best indeed tells us 
that a move away from state intervention and toward market allocation will not necessarily result 
in a pareto improvement within the context of other state and/or market failures. We have 
witnessed many times over now both liberalization efforts prior to crises and policy responses to 
crises, that might have been individually appropriate in the context of otherwise “perfect 
markets” according to economic theory, but lacked synchronization, sequencing, and, more 
importantly, coordination.72 
For markets to operate well they need considerable infrastructure that must be provided 
by the state, but state involvement has often been perverse. The issue is how states and markets 
can best complement. Market critics need to recognize that most of the recent currency and 
financial instability has been caused less by any inherent instability of financial markets than by 
financial markets reacting to perverse economic incentives generated by governments. Likewise 
market enthusiasts need to recognize that in the absence of an appropriate infrastructure of law 
and institutions, markets are unlikely to work well and where perverse economic incentives are 
in place that liberalization can sometimes do more harm than good. 
Slogans about government versus the market miss the point. The question is their 
appropriate relationships. Financial liberalization is an important requirement for economies to 
reach their long run growth potential. But liberalization is a process that must be managed 
carefully and requires as much attention to patterns of political influence as to technical 
                                                 
72 Alburo (1999), 456. 
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economic issues. This will not be an easy task, but looking at the right questions can be a big 
help. 
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